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Abstract (max 150 words) 
 
In an important and stimulating article, Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil argue in favor of applying 
institutionalist theory to understand the alliance politics of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy. But what 
promise does institutionalist theory really hold in thinking about highly unequal alliances nested in their 
particular threat environments? I argue that much work remains to be done to determine how much better 
institutionalist variables explain intra-alliance dynamics over alternative arguments that emphasize power 
and interests. Balances of power and the nature of threat environments may already account for key aspects 
of extended deterrent relationships supported by the United States in Europe and Asia. Ironically, the 
implication of this more traditional interpretation of alliances is that more continuity than change will 
characterize how Donald Trump will manage U.S. security relationships as President. 
 
Keywords (4-6) 
Trump, nuclear, alliances, proliferation, institutionalism 
 
Acknowledgements 
The author would like to thank the editor-in-chief of Contemporary Security Policy for comments on an 
earlier draft. 
 
Disclosure statement 
 
No conflict of interest was reported by the author 
 
 
Biographical note (max 150 words) 
 
Alexander Lanoszka is Lecturer in the Department of International Politics at City, University of London. 
His research addresses international security, alliances, US foreign policy, and East Central European 
defense issues. He previously has held postdoctoral fellowships at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and Dartmouth College after having finished a PhD in Politics from Princeton University. He 
has published in International Security, Security Studies, International Affairs, Survival, and other peer-
reviewed journals. He is completing a book manuscript on alliances and nuclear proliferation. 
 
 
 
2016 seems to have been a bad year for political institutions. Though institutions are supposedly “humanly 
devised constraints” that stick (North, 1990, p. 3), national constitutions and liberal democracy around the 
world are under increasing duress. It thus might strike some readers as odd to talk about U.S. nuclear 
weapons from an institutional perspective. If long-standing but apparently fragile constitutional 
democracies should be the most-likely cases of institutions demonstrating their robustness, then what are 
we to make of traditional military alliances today? Should highly unequal alliances be even more 
susceptible to power politics than those institutions predicated on clear checks and balances? In an 
important and thought-provoking piece, Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil make the positive case for 
applying institutionalist theory to understand the alliance politics of US nuclear weapons strategy. 
 
 Frühling and O’Neil (2017) argue that states have used their treaty alliances with the United States 
to influence various aspects of nuclear strategy even if they do not have their own independent nuclear 
capabilities. These authors advance our understanding of how these alliances operate by going beyond 
questions regarding their deterrent value or effectiveness. In their view, scholars have missed important 
variation in how nuclear weapons cooperation unfolds between the United States and their allies. 
Consultative fora are the predominant mechanism in bilateral nuclear security relations in East Asia, 
whereas we observe NATO featuring joint policy and sharing. These arrangements reflect bargains struck 
in the Cold War and the negotiating positions of allies.  
 
 As Frühling and O’Neil (2017) contend, these Cold War legacies still shape how cooperation 
evolves to this day. Indeed, they offer focal points for member states to coordinate their actions despite 
what different threat perceptions and strategic priorities they might have. They also provide the means by 
which members could proceed with making adjustments to their political and military commitments while 
preserving the credibility of the alliance. As such, any effort to “[reduce] the role and prominence of U.S. 
nuclear weapons … would remove a major avenue for United States influence, and therefore render it more 
difficult for current and future U.S. administrations to promote even conventional military burden sharing 
with non-nuclear allies” (Frühling and O’Neil, 2017, p. 17). 
 
 Yet the worry regarding disarmament that might have prompted this statement has probably given 
way to a very different worry. The surprise Presidential election of Donald Trump has led some observers 
to note that foreign policy recklessness and geopolitical instability will characterize his presidency. For 
one, he has spoken of he would not take nuclear weapons “off the table” even in Europe (MSNBC, 2016). 
For another, he appeared to suggest that he would be okay with Japan and South Korea acquiring their own 
nuclear weapons (CNN, 2016). Many worry that he will reduce military commitments to treaty allies, if not 
abandon them entirely, for the sake of making savings or appeasing other strong states like Russia. To the 
extent that alliances feature institutional constraints, it appears that they might be too delicate to survive his 
presidency.  
 
 Is an institutionalist perspective useful for illuminating the extended nuclear deterrent relationships 
among allies? How might a Trump presidency signal a departure from such institutional practices, to the 
extent that they exist? In this response article, I address these two questions in turn. I argue that it remains 
uncertain how explanatory power we should grant to institutions relative to capabilities and interests. As 
such, I claim that the enduring quality of American power and interests could mean more continuity than 
change with how President Trump goes about managing US alliances.  
 
The Utility of an Institutionalist Perspective 
 
Alliances serve to coordinate the defense and foreign policies of major states in the face of some sort of 
security threat. Yet an institutionalist perspective would argue that alliances are more than the sum of their 
parts insofar as one cannot reduce an alliance to the distribution of power characterizing its membership. 
Institutions reduce uncertainty by creating information flows where none existed before, solve commitment 
problems by creating new costs for reneging, and lower transaction costs by offering focal points for 
cooperation (Keohane, 1984, p. 107). These institutional benefits exert an independent (rather than an 
intervening) effect on state behavior that cannot be attributed to the balance of capabilities. 
 
 Does the institutionalization of nuclear-armed alliances affect state behavior? Führling and O’Neil 
admittedly seem torn on this point. On the one hand, they argue that institutional arrangements matter and 
offer a key source of variation among U.S. alliance arrangements (2017, p. 2). On the other hand, they 
emphasize how nuclear weapons cooperation among allies is “best explained by their relative bargaining 
power within their alliance” (2017, p. 3). If it is really about bargaining power, then they inadvertently 
vindicate Mearsheimer’s (1994, p. 33) critique of institutionalism. Consider how structural realists like 
Mearsheimer “believe that those rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the 
international distribution of power.”  
 
 At best, institutions constitute an intervening variable that affect how those capabilities modify 
behavior (see also Krasner, 1982, p. 5). Note that this realist interpretation of institutions does not deny the 
possibility of cooperation between states—to the contrary, it accepts that bargaining will take place among 
allies. It simply asserts that negotiated outcomes will largely reflect power asymmetries. In the context of 
alliances, these negotiated outcomes would still involve its members making voluntary contributions 
whatever the “significant political and financial costs” (Führling and O’Neil, 2017, p. 5).  
 
 This prediction for international cooperation seems to leave an opening for institutionalism. Can 
structural realism account for why we observe differences in U.S. alliance structures in East Asia and 
Europe?  
 
 I am no partisan of (structural) realism, but a persuasive case could be made that threat 
environments and bargaining power interact so as to shape the institutional form taken by alliances. During 
the Cold War, the underlying strategic problem facing U.S. decision-makers with regards to Europe is that 
their allies—largely close together on one landmass—faced a conventionally militarily superior Soviet 
threat. The United States was an ocean away. It thus had to resort to forward deployed forces and joint 
planning mechanisms in order to reassure Western Europe. This solution was not self-evident. Accordingly, 
NATO bore witness to various institutional proposals like the Multilateral Force that were intended to 
attenuate the security concerns of its membership and to maintain a strong cohesive deterrent. It finally 
reached an equilibrium by establishing the Nuclear Planning Group in 1966 and enshrining nonproliferation 
principles through the Nonproliferation Treaty (Brands, 2007).  
 
 The strategic situation was different in East Asia. Aside from there being two strong communist 
adversaries that were limited in their ability to project power over large distances in the region, each U.S. 
ally was separated by large bodies of water from each other. The additional need to restrain South Korea 
and Taiwan discouraged the sort of multilateralism seen in Europe (Cha, 2010). Moreover, the recent 
emergence of consultative fora like the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue may partly be a result of 
China and North Korea acquiring improved capabilities to threaten political and military values held dear 
by the United States and its regional partners.  
 
 The institutional arrangements we observe might therefore be more explicable in terms of the 
extended deterrence requirements than what Führling and O’Neil (2017) claim to be the case. Indeed, it is 
unclear how an institutionalist perspective of the sort they advocate is at odds with an extended deterrence 
perspective of the sort they criticize. That is not to say that institutionalism has no explanatory value in 
illuminating how U.S. alliances evolve over time. The fact that the United States and its allies expend 
diplomatic effort and resources establishing and adjusting these arrangements indicates their importance. 
Nevertheless, Mearsheimer’s challenge to institutionalism still stands in this case. Researchers are still left 
with the task of identifying what effects institutions have on state behavior beyond channeling interests and 
capabilities and, perhaps more importantly, determining how much weight to assign to each of those 
variables.  
 
Towards a New Era? 
 
My uncertainty over the value we should place on institutionalism might imply a concern for the durability 
of these alliances during a Trump administration. As mentioned, Trump has suggested that nuclear 
weapons “off the table” even in Europe and that he might even accept certain allies like South Korea or 
Japan acquiring their own nuclear weapons (MSNBC, 2016; CNN, 2016). If institutions really did have an 
independent effect on state behavior, then we might be optimistic that more continuity than change will 
characterize the next 4-8 years. 
 
 Here hardened realists can be optimists because much of what Trump has said has a strong tradition 
in American foreign policy since 1945. To begin with, it was U.S. policy to use nuclear weapons in Europe 
in the event of certain acts of Soviet aggression until at least 1989. A nuclear deterrent relies on the 
willingness and the ability of the defending state to use nuclear weapons, either to punish severely an attack 
or to deny an adversary from battlefield success. Trump’s statements are consistent with recent calls for the 
United States to update its nuclear deterrent posture (Durkalec and Kroenig, 2016).  
 
 U.S. decision-makers have even contemplated selective nuclear proliferation in the past. President 
Dwight Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles entertained the possibility of a European 
nuclear deterrent so that the United States could reduce its military presence on the continent 
(Trachtenberg, 1999, p. 151-152). President Richard Nixon saw nuclear proliferation as inevitable (Gavin, 
2012, p. 117). He even exploited Japan’s ambiguous stance on nuclear proliferation as a bargaining chip 
with China (Komine, 2009, p. 504). Trump might be using the threat of East Asian proliferation as a similar 
source of leverage. 
 
 If U.S. alliances exhibited persistence and stability through the decades, then that very continuity 
may speak to the durability of American national interests rather than to institutionalism per se. After all, 
the leaders of a powerful state like the United States have incentives for limiting the spread of nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear proliferation “might deter them from using military interventions to pursue their 
interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their 
alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their 
sphere of influence” (Kroenig, 2010, p. 17). The deterrent value of these alliances—especially those in East 
Asia—would remain high, especially if Trump wishes to be tougher on China. Any institutional measure 
intended to enhance that deterrent capability will likely remain in place. 
 
 It is too early to tell what changes are afoot with regards to U.S. alliances once Trump becomes 
President. Though good reasons exist for believing that predictions of change are overstated, one need not 
resort to the institutionalism proposed by Führling and O’Neil (2017) to explain continuity. American 
power and interests have an enduring quality of their own. 
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